William Saletan is debating Robert George and Christopher Tolefson on the question of whether it is permissible to use embryos for research. I think Geroge and Tolefson have the better of the argument, which is kind of like saying my dad can beat up your little brother. Saletan is a journalist, not a scientist or ethicist, so it’s not surprising he would struggle here, as he notes:
I’ve seen George pick apart fuzzy-thinking adversaries at meetings of the bioethics council. It’s like watching a cat with mice. Today, unfortunately, I’ll be the mouse.
The flow of the argument is that George and Tolefson have presented a narrative establishing conception as the start of life, and Saletan raises objections to that narrative — the presence of the mother’s RNA in the embryo, that the placenta is produced from the embryo which is not part of the adult being, and that twinning occurs after conception.
I found the twinning argument easiest to follow:
But in the case of twinning, they walk right into this alleged mistake. “The original embryo A lives until twinning occurs,” they propose, “and at that point, either A continues to exist and a new embryo comes to be by ‘budding’ from the original one, or (less likely, given recent findings) A ceases to be and two new embryos, B and C, come to be.” In other words, if I’m a budded twin, once upon a time there was an embryo that was something distinct from the living human organism that is now me, but that got transformed into the organism that is me at some point after the embryo came into existence. To escape this conclusion, George and Tollefsen have to accept either of two alternatives: that my twin and I are, through continuous identity, the same person; or that the original embryo was not, as they had posited, a “determinate individual.”
I think Saletan scores a point with this objection. The problem is that many observers will conclude from this that he has won the game.
Remember, we’re talking about whether it is permissible to, on a wholesale basis, use embryos for research. If we do it and it turns out we were wrong, we will have actively killed millions of other human beings. If we’re going to take that risk, I’d like it to be on a firmer basis than the fact that the opposition’s narrative of embryonic development is a bit tidier than reality.
If we were talking about allowing abortion, I could see how arguments like this can win the day. Restricting abortion is a significant limit to women’s liberty, and should not be undertaken unless we’re sure that what we’re protecting is a real human life.
But for goverment funding of embryonic research, the bar needs to be a little higher, since not doing it doesn’t limit anybody’s liberty, and we are all implicated in the act.
First: While many people find the notion of an intermediate moral status for the embryo attractive, the decision we are trying to make is basically binary: Either killing those embryos for our purposes is permissible or it is not. If it is permissible, then in no important respect does the embryo have a moral status above that of a mere thing. To put it another way, its supposedly higher status does it no good.
Second: Those closing lines make it sound as though Saletan wants us to proceed with embryo-destructive research, but with fear and trembling. But as Saletan himself points out at the start of the review, we are talking about routinized mass production and destruction of embryos. Assuming that we begin this enterprise with whatever amount of hand-wringing Saletan considers desirable, how likely is it that the hand-wringing will continue?
Saletan is correct that embryology messy. But it doesn’t flow from that that our moral decisions about embryos need to also be messy.
It is hard to imagine what Saletan’s “fear and trembling” policy would look like. Allow research but don’t fund it? Allow research for fatal diseases like ALS, but not for, say, restoring limbs for amputees?
The way this debate has gone has made me extremely skepticial that, especially in the face of success, we will accept any limits on this research once it is given the go-ahead. “How can you say no to hope?” It’s hard enough to do that on the basis that embryos are humans. Are we really going to try to do that on the basis that embryos are quasi-human, so it’s OK to use them to try to cure some diseases, just not yours?

