As I said below, the principle of double effect states:
This set of criteria states that an action having foreseen harmful effects practically inseparable from the good effect is justifiable if upon satisfaction of the following:
- the nature of the act is itself good, or at least morally neutral;
- the agent intends the good effect and not the bad either as a means to the good or as an end itself;
- the good effect outweighs the bad effect in circumstances sufficiently grave to justify causing the bad effect and the agent exercises due diligence to minimize the harm.
So how do we determine if the bad effect is truly separable from the good effect, or if the effect itself is good?
I propose the following standard: If efforts to minimize the bad effect, either before or subsequent to the act would make sense (absent a change of heart or realizing the first act was a mistake), then it may be the case that the act itself is good and be permissible under the principle of double effect.
For example, if I fire a gun at somebody, it may make sense for me to use a silencer. It may make sense for me to call for medical assistance immediately afterward. But it would make no sense for me to yell “Duck!” as I’m firing (beyond the practical limitations). The loud noise may be an unwanted side effect. The target’s death may be an unwanted side effect. But the bullet reaching its target is not.
Some more examples:
- It would not make sense to call someone a racist, and follow it up with, “no offense.”
- It would not make sense to provide SCUBA gear to somebody I was about to waterboard.
One other example that comes to mind is that offering Christ the wine as He was on the Cross was merely a cruel joke. They were torturing Him to death. That his the point of crucifixion.
If any effort to minimize the harm would render the act senseless, then that negative effect is an intrinsic part of the act. It is impossible to waterboard someone without intending to give them the sensation they’re drowning.
Let me stress that if an act clears this bar, it does not mean the act is justified; merely that, in the words of Cardinal Dulles, it “might arguably be licit.”
For example, the US dropped warning pamphlets before dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This made sense in terms of acting to minimize the harm. But, in itself, it does not establish the morality of the bombings.
